

c. Neither assumption in 2b above, however, is valid, for the reason that the above CIA totals include clerical interviews and EOD's which cause the ratio to shrink measurably. For example, FY-1963 interviews conducted by the Professional Recruitment Branch totaled 13,098 of the over-all 25,729--and accounted for but [REDACTED] EOD's, a ratio 25X9 [REDACTED] which closely parallels industry experience. Here again, however, PRB's 13,098 interviews were not altogether in the professional brackets, but, rather, resulted in the recommendation of [REDACTED] 25X9 technical Communications and clerical candidates, and, in [REDACTED] 25X9 [REDACTED] EOD's respectively. No record was kept of number of interviews in each of these categories. In FY-1962 and FY-1961, these same ratios of total PRB interviews to total PRB EOD's were [REDACTED] respectively.


3. The current Chief of Recruitment not only distrusts Interview statistics but in FY-1964 discontinued the record-keeping thereof and the requirement that monthly interview totals be reported by the recruiters. He distrusts this statistic because it is too easily padded by the man in the field unless the latter is required to support numbers with names; and to do this, he maintains, is record-keeping for the sake of record-keeping when the pay dirt of recruitment can be measured in the EOD

~~SECRET~~

25X9

column. He would cite, for example, that, in the comparison of FY-1963 with FY-1962 in paragraph 2 above, 3,347 more interviews (415%) produced [REDACTED] more EOD's (44%)--and this increase would be on the low side, he argues, because FY-1963 input (EOD) ended on a steeply ascending curve that left over 2,500 applicants undergoing security initiation (SI) for early FY-1964 induction if they had been needed. In any case, the remarkable upswing in EOD's in this situation cannot be attributed to the relatively shallow increase in interviews. C/PRD agrees that interviews are the lifeblood of recruitment, to be sure, but within limits. He considers of highest importance the sharpening of definitive requirements, component by component, branch by branch, job by job, so as to free the recruiter for the longer interview with the more likely future employee. This can be achieved only by the recruiter being fully armed with requirements so specific that the unqualified applicant can be disposed of politely but quickly. Definitive requirements can thus contribute markedly to the conservation of everybody's time and patience, starting with the recruiter and coming full cycle back to the branch chief whose personnel requisition is being filled.

4. Chief/PRD maintains that the far more significant statistic is found in the ratio of applicants recommended by Recruitment to applicants acceptable to components (SI), and that these ratios have



remained unusually high, slightly under 74% in FY-1963, over 79% in FY-1962, and over 75% in FY-1961. These are provable ratios and highly significant from our point of view. They would indicate that Recruitment is remarkably on-target in locating, recognizing, and recommending the talent required by the Agency. Therefore, any real savings in recruitment and EOD processing must be made in reducing the attrition that occurs between the point of security initiation and the projected EOD date, the area in which the Agency sustained losses (of all descriptions) of 27% in FY-1963, 43% in FY-1962, and 56% in FY-1961. In this important regard, there is a great deal to support the Chief of Recruitment's argument that there was a truly significant improvement in the Agency's total team effort in FY-1963 which reduced in-pipeline losses 16%. This would indicate a 60% improvement over FY-1962, and better than a 100% improvement over FY-1961. The term "team effort" is well chosen because the whole continuum of recruitment, placement, component selection, security investigation, and medical examination is involved once the applicant file reaches Headquarters with the recruiter's recommendation for employment.

5. Priority emphasis must be given, therefore, and is being given, we believe, to the timely deposit of recommended files in Headquarters by the recruiter himself; thence to the rapid "shopping" of the file by Placement Branch (POD) and CSPD; the quick decision for or

against the would-be gaining component; the immediate initiation of security field investigation, and, then, the earliest feasible examination of the candidate by Medical Staff, including the A&E Staff--all driving toward the objective of putting the Agency in a firmly competitive position with other employers (of whom there are over 1,000 regularly visiting major campuses) bidding for the candidate's services and seeking to have their firm employment offer in the candidate's hands six to ten weeks in advance of graduation, in the case of the college applicant.

6. Toward this end, this year, PRB will terminate its campus interviewing nationwide on 28 February, hoping for a late April to early May employment commitment to the June graduate that would then relegate the loss issue to a question of security or medical disqualification or, always, to the acceptance of a better salary offer. CIA conceivably could stop its campus interviewing in January, but there is evidence that the real quality candidates apply for interview in January and February, whereas, October interviews may bring out many of the "C" students at the baccalaureate level. CIA will never be able to control the higher salary offer factor of pre-employment attrition.

7. The on-target percentages of recommendations to component acceptances (SI's) cited in Paragraph 4 above, 74-79% do not suffer greatly when the clerical factor is not weighed in with this over-all

figure. (With clerical applicants, the Office of Personnel is the gaining component to be satisfied in this regard since it enjoys full hiring authority). Taking PRB's record, therefore, we still find a recommendation-acceptance ratio of 66% in FY-1963, 65% in FY-1962, and 58% in FY-1961, slow but steady improvement in an area of considerable selection sophistication, in this Agency, and in a climate in which the component customer has long, perhaps too long, been accustomed to massaging altogether more applicant files than might be necessary to satisfy his curiosity, and job requirements. Placement and Recruitment long have suffered by and with the component's insistence upon seeing "just one more file before we make up our minds." In this regard, the JOT Program may bear examination of its selection criteria since PRB historically has been up against recommendation/

25X9

8. Costs of hiring one person - interviewing, investigating, testing, giving a medical and polygraph examination and other processing are estimated at \$1,200, which reportedly computes for overhead of the Office of Security, Medical Staff, initial training on the job and the like. It cost CIA, therefore, at least [REDACTED] in direct costs to EOD

25X1A

25X9

9. The ratio of security initiations to each EOD is as follows:
JOT, 5-1; clericals, 1.7-1; communications, 4-1; professionals, 4-1.
There are very significant hidden costs in this area when one considers
that each security investigation alone costs at least \$212. In calendar
year 1963, [REDACTED] were given clearance after a full field investi-
gation and only [REDACTED] EOD'd - a difference of [REDACTED] We do not believe
that CIA should accept this situation as a cost of doing business. We
believe that CIA should take firm steps to correct this situation.

10. We do not agree with the Director of Personnel's memo-
randum to the Executive Director of 14 January 1964, "Applicant Cases
Cancelled After Full Clearance" in which he concludes that there is no
effective solution to the cancellation problem except to press the
interested offices to make more frequent review of cases in process.
We believe that a careful analysis of the October 1963 cases in which
the requesting offices cancelled after full clearance would seem to
indicate several problems: several applicants apparently were not
qualified for the jobs for which they were recruited; three applicants
made poor impressions which they should also have made on recruiters
or interviewers; ceiling limitations which could have been anticipated
much earlier by requesting offices were given as the reasons for
cancelling five cases; one JOT candidate was obviously unqualified,
had poor test scores and was not even acceptable to RID apparently.

ILLEGIB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

We believe that a general tightening of recruitment and interviewing standards, as well as an attack on sloppy personnel forecasts and monitoring by requesting offices are both in order.

11. It is difficult to compute the processing costs of people who do not finally EOD. The interviewing, investigating, and testing are fixed in each case. However, certain cases are not given polygraphs and medical examinations. There are no EOD travel expenses involved (to those eligible) and, of course, no initial training. If the figure could reasonably be set at \$1,000, this then would mean that there was in FY-1963 an outlay in the vicinity of [REDACTED] for people who were not hired. This added to the [REDACTED] cost for those that were entered on duty means that CIA really spent about [REDACTED] for FY-1963.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

12. The Office of Personnel and other DDS components have long recognized the high costs of processing new employees and have attempted to reduce them when possible. They have streamlined security investigations, medical examinations, testing, personnel processing, where possible. They are looking into other pre-screening possibilities. They are trying to tighten monitoring procedures. The additional action required to reduce these costs is primarily outside the Office of Personnel, the Office of Security and the Medical Staff, and lies with the four Deputy Directorates and the Office of the DCI.

More attention must be given by these offices to the costs of recruiting new personnel, to reducing attrition where possible, to refining forecasts of personnel requirements and monitoring cases in process.

ATTRITION

13. Although CIA's attrition is apparently less than the federal service generally, the loss represents a sizable cost which CIA should try to reduce. The most recent study of attrition brought to our attention compares CIA attrition with certain other agencies for FY-1962.

Veterans' Administration (Civilian United States)	20.69%	
Department of the Army (Civilian United States)	18.6 %	
Department of State (Foreign Service & General Schedule Personnel)	18.3 %	
Central Intelligence Agency (Overall)		25X1A
Atomic Energy Commission (FY-62) (Civilian United States)	10.3 %	
CIA Clandestine Services Career Service (Males 35-55 years of age)		25X1A
DD/I Career Services (Males 35-55 years of age)	4.2 %	

CIA lost 715 "professionals" in FY-1963 and 312 in the first six months of FY-1964. The clerical loss for FY-1963 was 806 and for the first half of FY-1964 it was 512. CIA's clerical attrition has been the past two years. Although no overall government statistics for clerical attrition are available, we may assume that CIA may at least

*Actually this percentage hovers closer to the includes FY-1962 cases resulting from action under Agency Regulation Separation of Surplus Personnel.

be no worse than other agencies. The over-all Federal attrition level for clerical personnel in Washington was recently cited in a Jerry Klutz column as being 33%. The loss of more than 1 profes-

special consideration.

14. We understand that the Office of Research and Reports has lost an average of 5 economists a month for several years, for reasons which are not clear. There is also high attrition in the Office of Central Reference, the Office of Current Intelligence, and the Office of Basic Intelligence, for several reasons. There is high turnover among analysts of the Records Integration Division (RID) of the clandestine Services because the work is routine and the personnel deliberately over-qualified for the job. RID ^{is used to some extent} as a sort of staging area for the JOT program and for CS Area Divisions. (The expansion of the JOT program may make it advisable to review this policy of RID). Since personnel management is a function of command in CIA, the Deputy Directors concerned should examine in depth the reasons for attrition in these and other areas where it seems out of line, and see what can be done about it. The Plans and Review Staff of the Office of Personnel could provide technical assistance in this recommended survey. ✓

15. The Office of Personnel in 1963 initiated a pilot program, "the gray lady program" - in which 23 women 35 to 50, living in the

Washington, D. C. area were recruited for selected clerical jobs in a two-drive concentration in only the Bethesda and Falls Church areas. We are told that experience to date indicates that these women perform at least as well as younger women, and are likely to remain with CIA longer than do our young women in their late teens and early twenties who comprise the majority of CIA's clericals. A spot check of exit processing records indicates that these young women leave to get married, return home for personal reasons, have children, because of a transfer of their husband to another area - not very surprising reasons. A few leave because of a job-connected problem, but these are a small percentage.

16. If the experience with the "gray ladies" holds up, we believe this program should be expanded into those areas of CIA where clerical mobility overseas is not a factor. This will not be a major solution to clerical attrition but it will help. A study of other possible ways of recruiting clericals who can perform effectively and who will stay longer should be made by the Plans and Review Staff. A&E Staff data on the kinds of people who can perform monotonous clerical jobs should be taken into consideration.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

- a. The Executive Director-Comptroller forcibly bring to the attention of all concerned the high costs of attrition and recruiting new personnel in CIA and the need for attacking this problem as a matter of some priority.
- b. The four Deputy Directors in collaboration with the Director of Personnel and the Office of the DCI examine in depth the reasons for high attrition in some offices and possible ways of reducing it. This should include a close examination of the character of the work, qualifications for the job, and personnel management practices in those areas where attrition is high.
- c. The Director of Personnel re-examine the present procedures for forecasting personnel requirements and monitoring cases in process, including security clearances, with a view to reducing the unacceptably large number of people who are fully cleared and yet do not enter on duty.